This paper proposes fast RSA-type public-key schemes based on singular cubic curves y2 + m y = z3 over the ring 2,. The z a n d y coordinates of a 2 log n-bit long plaintext/ciphertext are transformed to a log n-bit long shadow plaintext/ciphertext by isomorphic mapping. Decryption is carried out by exponentiating this shorter shadow ciphertext over Z,. The decryption speed of the proposed schemes is about 2.0 times faster than t h a t of the RSA scheme for a K-bit long message if [K/log 721 is even. We prove that breaking each of the proposed schemes is computationally equivalent to breaking the RSA scheme in one-to-one communication circumstances. We also prove that the proposed schemes have the same security as the RS.4 scheme against the Hastad attack when linearly related plaintexts are encrypted i n broadcast applications.
Introduction
In 1991, an RSA-type scheme over elliptic curves, i.e., non-singular cubic curves, was presented by Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto and \'anstone [4] . This scheme, the KMOV scheme for short, is more secure than the RSA scheme [9] against the Hastad attack [2] [6] . The decryption speed of the KMOV scheme, however, is 5.S times slower than that of the RSA scheme even if rapid computational techniques are used [5] .
By changing the base from elliptic curves to singular cubic curves, this paper proposes faster RSA-type schemes based on curves En : y2 + azy ZE z3 (modn) . The z and y coordinates of a 2 log n-bit long plaintext/ciphertext are transformed to a log n-bit long shadow plaintext/ciphertext by isomorphic mapping. Decryption is carried out by exponentiating this shorter shadow ciphertext over Z, instead of a sequential addition of the points over singular cubic curves En. The decryption speed of the proposed schemes is about 2.0 times faster than that of the RSA scheme for a IC-bit long message if [K/log 711 is even. LVe prove that breaking each of the proposed schemes is computationally equivalent to breaking the RSA scheme. This equivalence in security is guaranteed under usual one-to-one communication circumstances. We also prove that the proposed schemes have the same security as the RSA scheme against the Hastad attack when linearly related plaintexts are encrypted in broadcast applications.
The organization of this pa.per is as follows. Section 2 mentions singular cubic curves over a finite ficld and a finite ring. In Section 3, we describe new schemes. The efficiency of the proposed and other schemes is discussed in Section 4. The security of the proposed schemes is discussed in Section 5. Section 
A n addition "@" on E p ( a , b ) is yzuen by the chord-and-tnngent law sirnilwr lo t f i d f u r elliptic curves.
The sum (x3,y3) of (z,,y,) and (x2,yz) in Fp is computcd H S (a,b) . (a,6 ) is isomorphic to F;. The isomorphic relationship is generally described in (31 and [7] for curves (y -cyz)(y -px) = x3 over F;, where cr,P E F;, which is equivalent to equation (1) 
(3)
An addition on &(a, b) is defined by the chord-and-tangent law. Although the addition is not always defined, the probability for such a case is negligibly small for large p and q. By Theorem 1 and the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the following theorem holds. 
Y' -Y1
The following theorem is a base of a pair of an encryption and a decryption of publickey cryptosystems over E,(n, 0). proposed schemes can be used in both secret communications and digital signatures. For simplicity, we describe protocols of secret communications. The security of the proposed schemes is based on the difficulty of factoring n , which is a product of large primes p and q. Let a plaintext (m,,my) be an integer pair, where m,,rny E 2: and rn: $ mi (mod 1 2 ) . A concept of RSA-type schemes based on isomorphism over singular cubic curves is shown in Figure 1 . This figure also includes a flow diagram of scheme 1. In scheme 1, the encryption is carried out over E,(a,O) along the path from plaintext ( 7 n Z , m Q ) to ciphertext (c2,cy). In scheme 2 , the encryption is carried out over Z; along the path from plaintext 
Key Generation of Scheme 1 and Scheme 2
A key generation procedure is common for scheme 1 and scheme 2.
Receiver R chooses two large primes p and q. Let R = p q and N = lcm(p -1, q -1).
R determines an integer e satisfying gcd(e,N) = 1. Decryption keys d, and d, are respectively. R's public keys are e and 72. R's secret keys are p , q, dp and d,.
computed from encryption key e as d,, . Computations of cp and a, in the decryption of scheme 2 need less time than that of scheme 1 bccausc divisions of cp = c~,/c~, a n d a p = ( c: , -c~p)/c,pcyp can be avoided.
Efficiency

4.1
Since encrypt,ion key e ca.n be set a.s a. small valiie and decryption keys d,, d, are large enough such that logd, PZ log p , logd, RZ log q , we focus on the decryption procedure.
We evaluate the average number of modular muIt,iplications for decryption. Here, we assume log p N log q .
In the proposed schemes, i.e., scheme 1 and scheme 2, the dominant computations involve equations ( 3 ) and (5). They require 1.5 logp multiplications modulo p on average. Including the 1.5 log q multiplications m o d u l o q, the decryption of each of the proposed schemes requires about 3 logp inodrilar multiplications.
T h e block size for the RSA scheme is log 71 bits, and that for the proposed schemes is 2 log n bits. The number of modular iiiiilt,iplicatio~is in the new schemes and previously proposed schemes are slio\vn in Table 1 . Wc define "speed ratio"; the bigger the speed ratio is, the faster the decryption speed is. Let the decryption s p e d ratio of the RSA scheme be normalized to 1.0. \\'hen a ]<-bit long message is given, the speed ratios for the I<hlOV scheme a n d t. When integer s is even, the speed ratios for the KhlOV scheme a n d the new schemes are fixed as 0.17 and 2.0, respectively. If message length Ii' is uniformly distributed, the probability that s is even is 1/2. If message length I< is predetermined such that I( = 2 log 12, then integer s is always even. For tlie Demytko scheme based on elliptic curves [l] , its speed ratio is always fixed as 0.14 liecause the block size is log n. These results are summarized in 
Encryption Efficiency of Scheme 1 and Scheme 2
Although t h e dominant computations involve t.he decrypt,ions in scheme 1 aiid scheme 2 , we evaluate their encryption efficiency to compare thses sclienies. We focus on pure encryption procedures excluding isomorphic mapping procedures. Let ] e l be t h e bit- When we put b = 0, the addition formula in affine coordinates can b e rewritten in homogeneous coordinates as equations (7) and (8) in t h e Appendix. The revised formulae with minimum number of multiplications are equations (9) and (10) Proof: First, the equivalence between (i) and (iii) is shown as follows.
Assuming algorithm A1 is given, algorithm B is defined as follows.
Input: c,e,n
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
) from c, a and n by using isomorphic mapping, without knowing factors of n a.s
Compute (m,,m,) = Al(c,, cy, e , n ) .
In, output: m If algorithm A1 requires O ( T ) bit-operations, then algorithm B requires O(T + (log TI)^) bit-operations, and is polynomially reducible from algorithm A l .
Assuming algorithm B is given, algorithm A1 is defined as follows.
Input: (c,, cy), e, n
Step 1: Compute a = " c,cy -ci mod n.
Step 2: Compute c = 1 + G.
Step 3: Compute m = B(c, e, n ) . Next, the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) is shown as follows.
(ii) + (iii) Assuming algorithm A2 is given, algorithm B is defined as follows.
Step 1: Choose a E 2; randomly.
Step 2: Compute (m,,my) = A2(c,a,e,n) .
Step 3: Compute m = 1 + Output: m If algorithm A2 requires O ( T ) bit-operations, then algorithm B requires O(T + (log n ) 3 ) bit-operations, and is polynomially reducible from algorithm A2.
Assuming algorithm B is given, algorithm A 2 is defined as follows.
Input: c, a , e, n
Step 1: Compute m = B(c, e, 7 1 ) .
Step 2 
I
The above theorem is concerning on usual passive attacks. Consider possibility of active known-plaintext attacks. Assume that a n attacker knows a value of m y in addition to the values of c,, cy, e and n. The attacker aims at obtaining m, by solving cubic congruence m2 -mi mod n .
However, it seems difficult to obtain in, if breaking the RSA scheme is difficult. On 
Security in Broadcast Applications
In broadcast applications, the original RSA scl~eme is not secure if ellcryption key e is small. Let e and ni be public keys of the original RSA scheme for a receiver showed that similar attacks aimed at obtaining m can be successful by solving a set of k congruences of polynomials xy=o t,,mJ = 0 niod n,. The inequality condition for a successful attack is given by k n, , Iz;(fut1)/2(k + 1L + l)("fut')/22("+"+')2/2 (u + l)'+l, r = l where n, =min(n,). This condition is the most sensitive to the degree o of the obtained set of congruences of polynoinials. In the RSA scheme with the linearly related plaintexts m, = cy,m + /?,, the system of congruences in m with degree e can be obtained in broadcast applications. In the I<hlO\' scheme over elliptic curves, the system of congruences in m, with degree e2 can be obtained in broadcast applications.
Thus, it was shown in 161 that the KMOV scheme is more secure than the original RSA scheme against the Hastad attack.
We evaluate the security of the new schemes (i.e., scheme 1 and scheme 2) in broadcast applications, in which the plaintext is purely common or linearly related. First, consider schemc 1. There is a recursive formula for computing z, such that ( z r , y r ) shown that scheme 2 has the same security as the RSA scheme when linearly related plaintexts are encrypted in broadca.st applktions. Note that the RSA scheme with a purely common plaintext generates a simpler monomial m e than a set of polynomials with degree e . Thus, the new schemes are more secure than the RSA scheme when purely common plaintexts are encrypted in broadcast applications.
When modulus ni is 512 bits long and e = 5 , the Hastad attack is applicable if more than 16 ciphertests arc obtained for the new schemes and the RSA scheme with linearly related plaintexts. When modulus n; is 512 bits long and e = 19, the Hastad attack is applicable if more than 282 ciphertexts are obtained for the new schemes and the RSA scheme with linearly related plaintexts.
When modulus ni is 512 bits long and e 2 21, the I h s t a d attack is not applicable for the new schemes and the R S A scheme with linearly related plaintexts. Note that when modulus n, is 512 bits long and e 2 5 , the Hastad atta.ck is not applicable for the KMOV scheme.
We show numerical examples.
Conclusion
We have proposed fast RSA-type schemes over E,(a, 0). For a 2 log 1%-bit long message, the decryption speed of the proposed schemes is about 2.0 times faster than that of the R S A scheme. We have proved that breaking the proposed scheme is equivalent to breaking the 1tSA scheme.
